This paper explores a model of bond prices where agents have diverse prior beliefs about domestic and foreign inflation. In the long run, the foreign exchange forward premium reflects expected differences in inflation, but in the short run, it depends upon the diversity of prior beliefs. If some people have diffuse priors about a country's inflation process, then its currency commands a forward premium that is eventually dissipated. Using data on the dollar-mark premium from the 1980's, it shows that this kind of diversity really matters. Thus models with a single representative agent give an inadequate description of the data.
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Introduction
This paper takes the idea of heterogeneity in financial markets seriously. It develops a theory of the foreign exchange forward premium based upon the notion that people in the world economy have diverse prior beliefs about inflation. For most plausible specifications of prior beliefs, agents eventually have completely accurate knowledge about each country's inflation processes. Indeed, in the long run, yields reflect the common inflation forecasts, and the forward premium predicts expected depreciation of the spot rate accurately. Thus the asymptotic behavior of the world economy can be modeled using the artifice of a single "representative agent" having "rational expectations" about all the "fundamentals" in the world economy.
But in the short run a fascinating theory of asset prices emerges. This theory has two important elements. First, learning matters. Interest differentials depend upon the stochastic inflation history in the world economy, and the model provides a simple explanation for the "forward discount anomaly."
1 Second, the heterogeneity of beliefs matters. In this paper, I will show that it is not enough to ask traders what their inflation forecasts are; it is actually necessary to ask them how sure they are of their own forecast..
Because different classes of agents can hold more or less precise forecasts, bond yields typically have an option value inherent in them, even if everyone agrees on expected
inflation. An asset is worth the sum of its expected real stream of income and the option value of reselling it at a later date. This option value can never be negative, and it is typically positive. Thus yields are lower than they would be if the world economy consisted of a single representative agent.
1 See Engel (1996) for a good discussion Whether this effect is stronger for domestic or foreign assets is at the heart of the theory. One implication is that diverse precision of beliefs about a country's inflation process will raise the price of its bonds and thus lower their yields. Hence there will be a forward premium for that currency. An important insight is that all the moments characterizing agents' beliefs matter. Thus it is not appropriate to consider only each person's forecasts of expected inflation; it matters how precise these forecasts are.
How does a theory of asset prices emerge in a model where people have diverse prior beliefs? In particular, one question arises immediately: Why is this model not plagued by Milgrom and Stokey's (1982) No Trade Theorem? The answer lies in the subtle distinction between an environment in which agents have common priors but diverse ex post signals and one in which everyone has different priors but observes the same signals.
Consider, for example, the 500 th digit in the decimal representation of e. A speaker walks into the seminar room and offers a contract that pays $1 if that digit is 5. I may believe that it is likely to be an even number, and you may have more diffuse beliefs. We could easily announce our priors (thus establishing common knowledge), and we would both agree that you would pay more for the contract than I would. The model developed in Section 3 is akin to the first example. The analysis builds upon the work of Harrison and Kreps (1978) , who showed that the asset's price typically exceeded the valuation of the most bullish trader. They stated that this was a formalization of Keynes's notion of a beauty contest. Morris (1996) extended this work to incorporate learning in a Bayesian framework, and Fisher (2003) extended his model to explain asset bubbles that arose in the foreign exchange experiments reported in Fisher and Kelly (2000) .
This paper makes four contributions. First, it applies Morris's (1996) work by building a model of bonds and extends it by incorporating more general stochastic processes. Second, it is a completely novel analysis of the foreign exchange forward premium. To the best of my knowledge, no one has built or calibrated a model like this arbitrarily long, but your position too will be finite in practice. It will become apparent below that a limited short-selling assumption is necessary for equilibrium to exist in this kind of market.
in international finance. Third, the model's calibration shows that plausible priors can explain some of the forward premium for the German mark during the first half of the 1980's. That period and that currency were chosen to complement Lewis's (1989) impressive empirical analysis using Bayesian techniques of a reduced form model of the exchange rate. Fourth, I actually estimate the precision with which different classes of agents hold plausible prior beliefs; then I show that there is strong evidence in favor of a model with diversity of beliefs.
The typical homogeneous agent model in macroeconomics is just not supported by the data.
What are this paper's main results? First, it shows that diverse prior beliefs about a country's inflation process induce a forward premium for its currency at horizons greater than one month. Second, it shows that the "peso problem" is not as simple as has been assumed; indeed, the typical interpretation of this phenomenon imposes very severe restrictions on agents' beliefs. Third, it gives a simple explanation for a strong version of the forward discount anomaly. When there is diverse prior information about a country's inflation process, its one-month forward rate will be negatively correlated with realized depreciations. Fourth, the model is calibrated with actual data from the United States and Germany during the 1980's. The model performs well enough, although the effect of informational heterogeneity on the forward premium is not large in the calibrations. The calibrations of the model outperform a simple benchmark based upon covered interest parity, and they show that diversity of prior beliefs improves the model's fit. Fifth, I use a non-linear regression to test for homogeneity of beliefs in the data, and the Wald test overwhelmingly rejects the workhorse model in international finance. Diversity of beliefs really matters in these data.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a simple but extended example because the model is strikingly different from the norm in international finance. Section 3 contains a formal description of the model, and Section 4 discusses the forward premium both when there is one representative agent and when there are several agents in the world economy. Section 5 calibrates and then estimates the model for plausible specification of the agents' prior beliefs. It also shows that the models' predictions give rise to the forward premium anomaly. Section 6 gives some brief conclusions.
A Simple Example
Consider two zero-coupon bonds maturing in two years, one denominated in dollars, the other in euros, and each with a face value of 100. These two bonds are identical in every way--with respect to risk, liquidity, and other relevant factors--but differ solely in their currency of denomination. American inflation can take on one of two values: 0% or 8%. European inflation can assume the same two values. Thus the inflation rate in either country is a binomial random variable. To make things very simple, we will slow down economic time and assume that information relevant to inflation forecasts arrives only once a year.
There are two classes of agents in the world economy, and each has unbiased beliefs about domestic and foreign inflation rates. Everyone is risk neutral and has very precise beliefs about American inflation. But one class of agents has much less precise beliefs about European inflation. Table 1 summarizes the relevant priors.   3 3 DeGroot (1970, p. 40) shows that the natural family of conjugate priors is the beta distribution. This distribution has two parameters 0 > α and 0 > β , and its density function is This slightly lower price and higher yield reflect higher expected American inflation.
Thus both classes of agents will agree at the null history that the dollar bond will cost: Thus at the null history everyone will agree that the initial price of euro bonds is: 
per annum. The euro trades two years forward at a premium simply because the market has more diverse beliefs about European inflation. Still, the difference between the yields on one-year dollar and euro bonds at the null history would be:
since everyone has expects the same inflation rate for America and Europe.
For simplicity, impose that purchasing power parity holds after any history, and thus the nominal depreciation of the dollar reflects the realized inflation differential.
Assume further that the realizations of American and European inflation are described by independent binomial random variables with equi-probable outcomes. 4 Then, at the null history, the one-year forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the expected depreciation. The inflation profiles in each country are the relevant history. Thus
is a history of length 
analogous for the foreign inflation. 5 The null histories are such that
An agent's posteriors about the process driving domestic inflation are:
Likewise, the th i − agent's posterior beliefs about foreign inflation are:
Both integrals are taken over the relevant simplices. If the priors are well behaved, then these posteriors converge to the true inflation processes, but the speed of convergence depends in part upon the precision of initial beliefs.
Define an indicator function
Then a representative agent's forecast of expected domestic inflation is:
Likewise, a typical forecast of foreign inflation is:
where all the variables and the indicator function are analogous. In each of these formulas, the inner integral is taken with respect to a person's prior beliefs and the outer integral is taken with respect to realized inflation rates. Thus this model allows for a natural generalization of expected inflation where agents have heterogeneous priors about the mechanics of monetary policy.
Let the pricing kernel
have the rule
+ is the price of a domestic bond when the successor to history
Then the price of a domestic bond satisfies the recursion:
where 12 / c captures the fact that a pro-rated share of the semi-annual coupon is paid implicitly each month. The price of a foreign bond likewise satisfies:
These recursive formulae are at the crux of the model of the forward premium. They state a bond sells for what that most bullish class of agents will pay for it. This price is the expected present value of the pro-rated coupon and capital gains. But each agent's expectations depend upon prior beliefs about the relevant country's inflation process.
After history , t h the t T − forward discount on domestic currency is given by the difference between home and foreign yields. Thus
is the forward discount in percent per annum for a contract maturing at T . heroically that the real exchange is constant, 6 we see that the spot exchange rate is:
This definition follows the American convention: the exchange rate is denominated in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange. Since domestic and foreign inflation processes are independent multinomial random variables, the log of the spot exchange rate has a unit root. This model of the spot rate is unrealistic in the extreme, having little to recommend it other than analytical simplicity. Still, the actual rate of depreciation reflects the historical inflation differential, and purchasing power parity holds (identically) in every period.
The Behavior of the Forward Premium
The forward premium will depend in general upon all the prior beliefs and the stochastic realizations of the inflation profiles in the world economy. If ) (⋅ i ρ and ) ( * ⋅ i ρ are well behaved for every agent, then the posteriors will converge to the true (and initially unknown) inflation processes. Thus, after a sufficiently long history, the forward premium at any horizon will eventually reflect the expected inflation differential.
7 Since all the posterior beliefs converge to the true inflation profiles, it is appropriate to speak of "the inflation differential," and the most patient classes of agents will set the prices of domestic and foreign bonds. Then covered interest parity will insure that the expected depreciation of the domestic currency reflects the domestic inflation differential.
During the early periods, the forward premium is determined by the configuration of priors and by the (stochastic) initial realizations of the inflation. In general, the forward rate is not a Martingale. The easiest way to see this is to note that each agent's valuation of any bond depends upon both his priors and the history of inflation in both countries. The expected value of any stream of income--and thus the forward rate at all horizons--is not independent of history. Hence the spot exchange rate and the forward premium will be correlated in the early periods.
A general description of the forward premium is quite involved, and it is appropriate to consider two separate cases. I will first analyze the case with one representative agent in the world economy. Then I will discuss the general case with several agents.
A. One Representative Agent
Consider the situation in which one agent has prior beliefs ) (θ ρ and *) ( * θ ρ about the processes driving domestic and foreign inflation. There is no reason to require these beliefs to be unbiased, and there are no simple restrictions that might be imposed upon their correlation.
Assume that the representative agent has the same subjective expected inflation for the domestic and foreign central banks. Then, abstracting from Siegel's paradox, expected depreciation will be zero since both domestic and foreign bonds will be discounted identically. Still, the early history of inflation will have a strong effect on the forward premium, especially if either ) (θ ρ or *) ( * θ ρ are diffuse. For example, if there is an initial (random) spell of low inflation in the home country, the domestic yields will drop and foreign exchange will trade forward at a discount. Since yields reflect expected inflation, early realizations of the inflation process are doubly important for bonds with a long horizon. First, they occur when the agent's beliefs have the least precision. Second, the movements in the price of long bonds are amplified since their time to maturity is distant. Thus the forward premium at long horizons will be quite volatile initially.
What if the subjective probabilities are biased? Then the country with the higher subjective expected inflation has a bond that trades at a steep discount and a correspondingly high yield. Hence that country's currency will trade at a forward discount. In the long run, the actual realizations of the inflation rate will reflect the true underlying monetary process. The econometrician will observe a secular change in the forward premium that is not justified by the actual historical inflation differential. If the original priors are quite diffuse, then the period of learning will be fairly rapid, and forward premium will forecast the actual rate of depreciation of the spot exchange rate after only a short time. But if the (incorrect) prior beliefs about either country have a high degree of precision, then the econometrician would see a very long period during which the forward premium was a biased predictor of changes in the spot rate.
B. Several Types of Agents
If there are several heterogeneous agents in the world economy, then a fascinating theory of asset prices emerges. First, all of the elements of learning are still present.
Second, the heterogeneity of beliefs also matters. In particular, the price of a bond now reflects both the subjective expected present value of its cash flow and the option value of reselling it after some future history. Hence a currency will trade at a forward premium if there is a wide diversity of opinion about that country's inflation process. Since foreign exchange is traded forward at one month, three months, six months, and a year, this option value is highest for forward rates at longer horizons. Also, the one-month forward rate will not include a component having to do with the heterogeneity of beliefs.
It is easiest to illustrate these ideas by imposing in the rest of this subsection that agents have conjugate prior beliefs about the actual inflation and have identical subjective discount factors. Assume that agent i has conjugate priors described by Dirichlet distributions with parameters ) ,... 
The first important fact is that if all the agents' priors about a country's inflation process have the same precision, then the agent who is initially most bullish about a country's inflation prospects will always be so. This agent will always hold that country's bonds, and there will be no option value inherent in bonds denominated in its currency at long horizons. Here's why. Let i be such that
9 Since all the priors about domestic inflation have the same precision, we may put
Hence the ranking of the agents' expected inflation forecasts does not change since they all observe the same history. Then a simple argument using backward induction from any terminal history shows that this agent will pay the most for the bond denominated in the domestic currency. Of course, the same is true for the class of agents that is most bullish about foreign inflation, even though the relevant precision about that process may be different. Thus no bond price will have any option value inherent in it, and the forward rate at any horizon will reflect a simple learning process.
This observation has important implications for the forward premium. Only when agents' prior beliefs are of different precision will a bond have a lower yield than that forecast by the most bullish group in the world economy.
10 In other words, the higher moments of the priors matter in a model with limited short selling, an illustration of Morris's (1996) switching condition for this model. Thus, if people in the world economy have unbiased but heterogeneous beliefs about a country's inflation prospects, then its bonds will have a relatively low yield, and its currency will trade forward at a premium.
Now consider the polar case where at least two the agents' prior beliefs have different precision but all the agents have the same initial forecasts for domestic inflation. . A second important fact is that only these two classes of agents will ever hold the domestic bond, and there is a simple way of describing who holds these bonds at what times. The agents with the most precise priors hold domestic bonds if and only if the history has been such that
. In other words, the agents with the most precise prior beliefs hold domestic bonds when average domestic 10 A colleague's comments helped me hammer this point home more forcefully. Imagine testing my ideas using survey data on inflation expectations. It is not enough to calculate the dispersion of point forecasts among different classes of traders. Instead, it is necessary to get data on how sure each agent was about his or her forecast. Since inflation surveys typically do not collect this kind of information, one must make a strong statistical assumption linking dispersion of forecasts among agents with the degree to which some of them felt that their subjective beliefs were precise or imprecise.
inflation has been high and those with the least precise beliefs hold them when it has been low.
Here's why this fact is true. One can always write the posteriors as: This discussion provides a simple explanation of the "forward premium anomaly." If agents have heterogeneous beliefs, then the forward premium will depend upon the stochastic history of the world economy--even when everyone has unbiased priors about the inflation differential and expected movements in the spot exchange rate.
Consider the simple case when the foreign inflation process is known and thus everyone has perfectly precise and unbiased prior beliefs about foreign inflation. Assume also that there are two types of agents with unbiased beliefs about domestic inflation; one group has very precise priors and the other has imprecise ones. At the null history, everyone expects the spot exchange rate to depreciate according to the common expected inflation differential. After a history of high home inflation, only people with precise priors would hold home bonds. Thus short-term interest rates--based upon asset prices for which the option value of eventual resale is negligible--would still reflect the actual expected inflation differential, and the one-period forward premium would not be correlated with future depreciations. But after a history of low home inflation, the agents with imprecise priors hold domestic bonds and the interest differential would be lower than the actual expected inflation differential. Thus the one-period forward premium would indicate an expected appreciation that would not happen on average. Hence there is a negative correlation between actual depreciations and the one-period forward premium.
Thus there is an ineluctable interaction between each agent's expectations about the inflation processes and the degrees of precision that characterize his beliefs. Also, the volatility of the forward premium depends upon the precision of these prior beliefs. The less the precision, the greater the volatility of bond prices and the greater the reaction of the forward premium at long horizons. This premium will exhibit conditional heteroscedasticity since periods of high volatility are bunched together because agents are learning about the true inflation processes during the initial periods of the world economy.
The volatility of the forward premium will also be higher if either there are diffuse priors about a bond that has low coupon payments. Since such a bond has a relatively long duration, small changes in expected inflation have a large effect on yields.
Thus the forward premium will move significantly with the advent of news relevant to forecasting inflation. This model of the forward premium also has important implications for the "peso problem," first described in an analytical framework by Krasker (1980) . When will a country's currency trade at a forward discount for a sustained period, even if the econometrician has observed no large depreciation of the spot rate? One obvious possibility is that agents anticipate a large devaluation that occurs with a small probability; in this model, that notion corresponds to an element in the support of a country's inflation process that is very large but which may have small weight. But it is obvious that the "peso problem" endures only when all classes of agents have high precision about a small probability event, an unlikely situation indeed. Instead, it is quite plausible that people have diffuse priors about the monetary policy of a central bank undertaking a new regime of price stabilization. This diversity of beliefs would tend to keep the forward currency strong, and learning would tend to undercut any initial fear of hyperinflation. Thus the forward discount reflects both the lack of confidence in the inflation reduction scheme and the degree of conformity in traders' beliefs.
The Model and the Data
This section accomplishes three goals. First, it describes the data from an important period in recent monetary history during which the dollar traded forward at a discount, even though it continued to appreciate on the spot market for almost five years. Second, it shows in detail how the model was calibrated. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first attempts at calibrating a model in which the diversity of prior beliefs has substantial empirical bite. Third, it actually estimates the model and shows that diversity of prior beliefs may well characterize the data. Again, I believe this is the first time that a model in macroeconomics or finance with heterogeneous beliefs has been estimated and then tested.
A. Data on the Dollar-Mark Forward Premium and the Relevant Inflation Rates
Figure 1 presents monthly data on the mark forward premium at different horizons during the first half of the 1980's. This was a period during which it was common for the dollar to trade forward at a discount, although there was a continued appreciation of the dollar until after the Plaza Accord in September 1985. This episode of international monetary history gave rise to a large literature on the foreign exchange risk premium. Two facts are salient. First, the dollar was trading forward at a discount during this entire period. Second, the actual change in the spot exchange rate was an order of magnitude larger than the forward premium, and the forward premium was the wrong sign during most of this period. Two other facts are worth emphasizing. First, the forward premia at different horizons are highly correlated. Second, all the premia were much more volatile at the beginning of this period, when Paul Volcker became chair of the Federal Reserve Board, than at the end, when a successful disinflation had been undertaken. The next step is to gather data on the actual inflation rates of Germany and the United States during those five years.
11 The median rates of consumer price inflation, calculated from the sixty annualized monthly changes, were 3.2% in Germany and 3.8%
11 I used the BLS series for all urban consumers (all items) not seasonally adjusted for American prices. The data on German prices are completely analogous, and they come from the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. The spot exchange rate and forward premium were given to me in private correspondence by Nelson Mark. They were originally weekly data, and I chose the first week of each month to constitute the relevant monthly data. The interested reader will find all the data used in this paper at http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/efisher/Dollar_Mark_Historical.xls. They span the period from March in the United States. The data generating processes for these time series presumably have continuous support, but the model is analytical and computationally tractable only for a multinomial distribution.
12 Indeed, the model implies that all the moments of the processes describing beliefs about inflation matter, and I had to make a choice about how best to model the inflation processes using multinomial distributions with discrete supports. Table 1 shows a tractable histogram describing the distributions of the actual inflation rates. These data were used in the simulations. Why did I choose histograms with five bins? One needs a model with at least three bins to have independent measures of the first two moments of the inflation process, and I though that higher moments also might matter. In brief, I classified the actual inflation histories for the two countries using these discrete data. 13 Even with this simple structure 1973 (the beginning of the modern era of floating exchange rates) through December 1985 (three months after the Plaza Accord). 12 Truth in advertising dictates that I should emphasize again that the assumption of independently and identically distributed data generating processes is probably at least as problematic as assuming discrete supports. 13 There is a practical problem lurking in these discrete supports. The support for the American inflation process is more dispersed than that for German inflation. The model indicates that forward premium will depend upon inflation expectations along all possible histories, even those not realized in the data. Thus Siegel's paradox will tend to make dollar-denominated bonds more valuable, especially at long horizons. The implied American yields will be lower than would if the two inflation processes had identical discrete supports. The simulations all impose that the discount factor for each class of agents is 0.97 and that domestic and foreign assets are both zero-coupon bonds.
Two separate cases were examined initially. First, I imposed rational expectations about the actual German and American inflation processes; this is a very strong form of rational expectations because it assumes that the agents know the entire histograms of these processes, except for a multiplicative constant that is interpreted as the precision of the prior belief. Thus one class of agents was given this prior for . These priors correspond to the actual historical inflation processes that occurred from January 1981 through December 1985, and both have unitary precision. The other class of agents was given the same unbiased priors, but the precision of their beliefs was allowed to vary, assuming values of 1, 10, or 100.
14 In the second case, agents had "adaptive expectations"; their prior beliefs were based upon inflation histories during the 93 previous months from March 1973 to December 1980, the entire modern era of floating exchange rates. Hence in this second case, one class of agents was given these priors for American inflation . The second class of agents had the same beliefs, but they held them with precision 1, 10, or 100.
What is a good benchmark against which to judge the model? The simplest model of the forward rate imposes covered interest parity. Then the Fisher equation and the assumption of real interest rates equalization imply that:
is the expected (annualized) domestic inflation rate between t and T .
This expectation is taken with respect to the history I conclude this subsection by emphasizing that a plausible model of the forward premium can be calibrated, and it fits the data at least as well as the usual benchmark.
There is preliminary evidence that the diversity of prior beliefs does indeed matter. 
C. How to Estimate some of the Model's Parameters
In an important sense, the calibrations in the previous subsection are too facile. The model with two representative agents has 22 parameters: each agent has five parameters that describe prior beliefs about the American inflation process, five others that characterize the German inflation processes, and a subjective discount factor. The model is a complicated mapping from these parameters to predictions about the data, and it is entirely appropriate to consider a nonlinear regression. Let
( β be a such a specification. Here t y is the forward premium, t x includes the history of inflation that is in the information set for the relevant forward premium, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The interpretation of the error term t u is twofold.
First, the discrete inflation processes imposes aggregation errors. Second, a parsimonious parameterization will inevitably leave out some important factors that do indeed explain the forward premium.
It is appropriate to keep the estimation of the model as simple as possible, for reasons of both analytical elegance and empirical tractability. First, I imposed that the two agents had an identical discount factor 97 .
; it is notoriously difficult to estimate these parameters accurately, and I am already conducting an unorthodox empirical analysis. Second, I again examined the same two kinds of prior beliefs: strongly rational ones and Bayesian adaptive expectations, those introduced in the last subsection. Third, I will assume again that I am dealing with only two classes of agents.
An important empirical contribution of this paper is that I actually use the data
to estimate the precisions of the agents' beliefs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that any empirical work in international finance has taken a model with heterogeneous prior beliefs to the data. Everything has been set up to estimate these five parameters: a constant term and the precision of the beliefs of two classes of agents about American and German inflation. Since the model's other 17 parameters have been tied down, I have some hope of getting reasonably accurate estimates of the remaining five. Table 4 summarizes the non-sample restrictions that I have imposed.
In sum, I estimate the following non-linear models Judge et al (1982, chapter 24) . 15 The first step is to minimize the sum of squared errors between the model's predictions and the data; I used the data at all four horizons because the model has predictions for each horizon, given the inflation history. The second step is to evaluate the gradient
at the estimated coefficients and each of the 240 data points. The inner product of the resulting 5 240 × matrix gives the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters. Because this is a model of Bayesian learning, the error terms in this model are not independent across time, nor are they independent across the different horizons at which foreign exchange is traded forwarded.
So the third step corrected the standard errors from the non-linear least squares estimates using the Newey-West (1987) Let me conclude this subsection with a brief summary. This is the first time that any model with diverse prior beliefs has been brought to the data. There is evidence in favor of two salient facts: (1) learning matters for a proper model of the forward premium; and (2) a model with one homogeneous agent misses an important element of the data. The diversity of prior beliefs matters most in the early periods of the model; this makes a lot of sense because sooner or later the actual data will overwhelm any sensible prior beliefs that are brought into a new inflation regime. This is the fundamental empirical contribution of my work.
D. The Model and the Forward Premium Anomaly
The empirical discussion so far has avoided the obvious question: Do the predictions also exhibit the forward premium anomaly? In one sense, this query is a straw man because the model imposes the Procrustean requirement that the spot exchange rate satisfy purchasing power parity in every period. Still, there are good theoretical reasons for which the anomaly will arise in this model. West correction has been applied to this regression, and I again used a lag of 13. There is overwhelming evidence that these calibrations exhibit the forward premium anomaly, although the estimates of 1 γ are not as negative as in some other studies. The main reason that the model's predictions show the forward premium anomaly is that, after a few periods, the predicted forward premium becomes largely stable. Thus a high inflation realization doesn't move the forward premium very much, but it does cause a depreciation of the spot exchange rate because of the model's strong assumption about a constant real exchange rate. Hence there is little correlation between realizations of the spot exchange rate and the forward premium. Since the way the spot exchange rate is modeled is so artificial, I do not attach much importance to the fact that the estimated model exhibits the anomaly.
Conclusions
This paper has developed a new theory of the forward premium based upon a model that takes heterogeneity in financial markets seriously. The model has striking predictions for the forward premium; it show that diverse beliefs about a country's inflation process make its currency trade forward at a premium in contracts whose horizons are greater than one month. The calibration of the model is perhaps plausible, but it predicts perhaps too much learning. Still, the notion that agents had diverse beliefs about German monetary policy and doubted that inflation could be abated at the beginning of the 1981 is indeed intuitive.
My primary empirical contribution is that I actually estimate the precision with which different classes of agents in the world economy held plausible prior beliefs.
There is evidence in these data that a model with one agent is just not an accurate description of world asset markets. This is the first time that an extension of the elegant models based upon Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996) have been taken to the data, and my work shows that these authors were quite right to worry about diversity of beliefs in financial markets.
The model has many weaknesses. First and foremost, it is ludicrous to impose that the real exchange rate is constant. My only defense is that a good model of the spot exchange rate is left to those with superior analytical powers. Another important weakness is that the model assumes that inflation process in each country is independently and identically distributed. Inflation is obviously correlated between countries and across time, but this fact is difficult to incorporate into an analytically tractable model with Bayesian learning. The calibrations and the estimates are suggestive but not exhaustive. Again, my defense is that there is no other study in international finance that takes a structural model with heterogeneous priors and Bayesian learning to the data. So this empirical work is just a first step.
Perhaps this paper will spur other researchers in international finance to investigate models with heterogeneous beliefs. It is remarkable that the "forward discount anomaly" can be explained so easily in a model with risk neutral agents. It is essential that we economists be careful in our interpretations of the notion of rational expectations as an equilibrium concept. Models with heterogeneous prior beliefs are more general than the usual ones with one representative agent. The equilibria described in this paper all converge to the "rational expectations equilibrium" if agents' priors are well behaved. And the typical model used in international finance is a special case of the one that has been explored; after all, one can always impose that everyone's (perfectly precise) priors agreed with the actual distribution of inflation. But informational heterogeneity and limited short selling surely characterize actual financial markets. So it would be nice to continue building models that incorporate these obvious facts. 
